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This article examines immigrant political participation in the 2009 
Irish local government elections drawing mainly on interviews with 
African and East European candidates. Almost half the immigrant 
candidates who stood in the 2009 elections participated in the study. 
All were comparatively recent migrants; just one was an Irish 
citizen. A limited body of international research examines the role of 
social capital in political participation using a narrow 
operationalisation of this concept limited to trust and reciprocity 
scores. Our research is distinctive in that it operationalises a 
broader definition of social capital. Drawing on the work of Robert 
Putnam and Pierre Bourdieu, the research considered the role of 
individual human, social and cultural capital, defined in terms of 
socio-economic status, pre-migratory political socialisation, 
membership of immigrant and Irish groups and organisations, 
religiosity, motivational stakes and residency/citizenship status 
factors, to examine differences between both cohorts. 
Keywords: Cultural capital; social capital; socio-political capital; 
motivational stakes; politics; Ireland; immigrant political 





Transformations to the Republic of Ireland (hereafter Ireland) brought about by mass 
immigration since the 1990s are the focus of a growing body of social science 
literature yet research from a political science perspective has been limited. Much of 
the research focus to date has been on the politics of the 2004 Citizenship Referendum 
and on top-down responses to immigrants (Fanning and Mutwarasibo, 2007; Garner, 
2007; Lentin, 2007a, 2007b). A handful of empirical studies have examined the 
responses of Irish political parties to immigrants. Positive Politics (Fanning et al., 
2004) was undertaken on behalf of an African NGO in advance of the 2004 local 
government elections in which most residents were entitled to vote. It found that Irish 
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political parties made minimal efforts to attract the support of immigrant voters and 
did little or nothing to encourage these to become party members. A second study 
(Fanning et al., 2007), undertaken in advance of a general election in 2007 in which 
few immigrants were entitled to vote, found openness-in-principle to immigrants 
amongst Irish political parties but identified few concrete measures to reach out to 
immigrant communities. In Northern Ireland, only one study has specifically 
investigated the responses of political parties to immigrants, in this case via an 
analysis of party manifestos (McGarry et al., 2008). 
 Our research is distinctive in its focus on immigrant political participants; it 
draws on interviews with eighteen immigrant candidates (almost half of those) who 
contested the 2009 Irish local government elections as well as on interviews with a 
number of immigrants strongly active within Irish political parties.
1
 The aim of the 
research was to identify factors that influenced immigrant political participation with 
a view to testing a series of hypotheses generated in the absence of previous research. 
The study examined the role of socio-political capital, motivations for participating in 
politics and (residency/citizenship) status-related factors, distinguishing between 
African respondents (the predominant immigrant participants in the 2004 local 
government elections) and candidates from EU countries. It was anticipated correctly 
that most of the latter would be Polish. The research was undertaken in a context 
where Ireland‟s large (12.5 percent) immigrant population is predominantly non-
citizen recent arrivals who are nevertheless entitled to stand and vote in local 
government elections. All ten of the African candidate respondents first came to 
Ireland between 1999 and 2003. The eight Polish and two other East European 
respondents arrived between 2000 and 2006.  
                                                 
1
 The study was funded by the Irish Research Council for the Humanities and Social Sciences 
(IRCHSS). 
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 Six African candidates stood as independents in the 2004 local government 
elections; of these two were elected as councillors. Both of these were well-educated 
former asylum seekers with broadly similar experiences in Ireland. Rotimi Adebari 
(who was subsequently appointed as Ireland‟s first black mayor) had found it very 
difficult to secure employment once entitled to work and became involved in 
community groups in Portlaoise before entering politics. Taiwo Matthews had 
qualified as a doctor but, unable to work, established himself as a religious minister in 
Ennis, Co. Clare. No equivalent role models could be identified for other immigrant 
groups. Whilst the 2006 Census of Population identified the Polish community as the 
largest of all immigrant communities, most of these had arrived in Ireland following 
EU enlargement and the previous local government elections in 2004.  
Research on African integration in Ireland has to date focused considerably on 
the role of religious social capital, African elite formation and immigrant civic 
participation (see Mutwarasibo and Smith, 2000; Ugba, 2007). Several African 
community organisations have been founded since the late 1990s but two have 
emerged as particularly important community networks: Akina Dada wa Africa 
(AkiDwa), a women‟s organisation, and the African Centre (see De Tona and Lentin, 
2007; Akinjobi, 2006). Both have memberships that include Africans of different 
nationalities and religious backgrounds (including Muslims). A cohort of established 
African community activists, centring on such organisations, is identifiable, within 
which members are typically active in capacity building roles in immigrant 
community groups and churches and community development organisations (Africa 
Centre, Strategic Plan 2005-2008: 5). 
For example, the Africa Centre‟s Strategic Plan for 2005-2008 emphasised the 
need to strengthen the capacity of African communities to participate in Irish society, 
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to promote the „genuine representation of minority communities‟ and to promote civic 
integration amongst African communities (ibid. 7). After the 2004 election the Centre 
undertook action research aimed at fostering civic and political participation. The 
resultant Inclusive Citizenship in 21
st
 Century Ireland: What Prospects for the African 
Community? depicted African respondents, from Dublin, Dundalk and Waterford, to 
be strongly engaged in community activities (63 percent) and very strongly interested 
in becoming politically active (98 percent) but found that actual political participation 
rates were much lower. For example, just 2 percent of those surveyed described 
themselves as members of political organisations and just 27 percent had voted in the 
2004 local government elections. Respondents identified a range of specific barriers 
to civic participation including racism, language barriers and a sense of insecurity 
(Ejorh, 2006). Inclusive Citizenship emphasised how „civil society provides the space 
for the marginalised to assert themselves and to contribute to the public sphere – 
activities that embody the „stuff‟ of citizenship, often in the absence of its formal 
acquisition‟ (Feldman et al., 2005: 10). Such civic activism emerged in a context (or 
even because) Africans have found it more difficult to integrate within the economy 
(Fanning, 2009: 153). As a relatively established (pre-2004) immigrant cohort, 
Africans have been at the forefront of bottom-up immigrant political participation. 
By comparison, considerably less was known about how EU Accession State 
migrants might engage in civic or political participation. Crucially, most had lived in 
Ireland for a shorter period. Poles became the largest ethnic minority group (63,276) 
as identified in the 2006 census. Of these some 33,400 had arrived in Ireland in the 
twelve months before the census (CSO, 2007a: 37). Poles were found in 2006 to have 
the most one-sided male/female ratio of all immigrant communities with 64 percent 
male and 36 percent female. Seven out of 10 were in the 30-34 age group and over 60 
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percent were single. Most Poles were living in Polish-only households, with non-
family households dominating (ibid. 73). A very significant 59 percent of married 
males and 18 percent of married females were not living with their spouse at the time 
of the census suggesting that many had families in their country of origin. By contrast, 
the percentage of married Nigerians not living with their spouse was relatively low at 
8 percent. This census profile suggests that many Polish migrants perceive themselves 
as temporary residents in Ireland and do not have the kinds of communal social ties 
likely to foster civic and political participation. 
However, since 2004 Polish has quickly become the second most commonly 
spoken language in Ireland. The commercial significance of this is exemplified by the 
publication of a Polish language weekly supplement of a major daily newspaper 
(Evening Herald) and by fairly widespread advertising of private sector services in 
Polish. Poles were far less likely than Africans to be economically marginalised but 
likely to experience an employment penalty compared to Irish people with similar 
education and skills (Barrett et al., 2006). Some 95 percent of Polish adults (the 
highest percentage of all immigrant groups) were identified as being in paid 
employment in 2006 (CSO, 2007b: 47). We considered that Polish political activism 
was less likely to be motivated by personal experiences of racism. Yet, labour market 
discrimination of migrants (especially in the construction sector) had become 
politicised. The number of immigrant (non-citizen) trade union members rose by over 
50 percent from 24,800 to 37,100 between 2005 and 2007. 
To a considerable extent Polish civic and political activism in Ireland seemed 
preoccupied with Polonia (the Polish Diaspora) rather than focused on Irish 
institutions. For example, campaigns to develop Polish language schools have been 
directed at the Polish consulate and 22,000 persons living in Ireland voted in the 2007 
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Polish elections (over one third of the Polish population as identified by the 2006 
census) (RTE, 2007). 
 
The context of immigrant political activism 
 
In the absence of previous studies of immigrant political participation this research 
was inevitably exploratory. It examined three sets of factors understood from the 
international literature and from available Irish data to potentially influence the 
participation of immigrant candidates in the 2009 local government elections. In 
summary these were: 
 
 Socio-Political Capital: defined to include any human, social and cultural 
capital that positively contributes to the capacity of a person to engage in 
political activism and participation.  
 Motivational Stakes: any perceived identifiable interests in political outcomes 
either in terms of individual gain or as a member of an immigrant community. 
  Status factors: refer to the ways in which citizenship and legal status directly 
or indirectly influence immigrant participation. Status factors are seen to 
influence the identification of motivational stakes. 
 
Social capital is generally defined as the social benefits resulting from social 
connections, shared values, trust and reciprocity. The term “socio-political capital” is 
coined here to refer to the ways in which cultural, social and human capital might 
contribute to the capacity of individuals to participate in political processes. As 
examined here, it includes prior political socialisation and elite status within 
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communities of origin. Cultural capital as defined by Pierre Bourdieu includes the 
knowledge, experiences and connections which confer advantages upon individuals in 
distinct social settings (see Bourdieu and Passeron, 1977). Bourdieu‟s concept of 
social capital is relational and centres on the resources (and obligations) which accrue 
to members of groups or networks. He defines social capital as: „The aggregate of the 
actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of 
more or less institutionalised relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition‟ 
(Bourdieu, 1986: 249). For Bourdieu, social capital “lubricates” civil society; „the 
outcome is a voluntary provision of collective goods, such as common norms, 
predictability in human exchanges, and trust‟ (Svendsen and Svendsen, 2004: 247). 
Bourdieu uses the concept of „field‟ to denote the specific context of interaction (such 
as a political setting) and the concept of „habitus‟ to denote the internalised attributes 
of individual actors that confer advantage in specific fields of social interaction; each 
field has its specific capital and its dominant habitus (Grenfell and James, 1998; 
Kauppi, 2004). By participating in particular fields, individuals accumulate forms of 
social capital and this in turn shapes habitus as an internalised disposition. Bourdieu 
presents individual behaviour as a kind of social game where habitus may or may not 
confer advantages in particular fields of social relations; „individuals may be in, or 
out, of the game, and may or may not have the necessary capital to play it to their 
advantage‟ (Grenfell and James, 1998: 25). 
James Coleman, like Bourdieu, adopts a relational view of social capital, 
seeing it as a collective good and as a resource for action that is instrumental in the 
creation of human capital (Coleman, 1988). However, the conceptual popularity of 
social capital in recent years is largely attributable to the work of Robert Putnam (see 
Putnam, 2000). Putnam influentially distinguishes between “bonding” social capital, 
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whereby membership of delimited groups or organisations confers advantages upon 
members, and “bridging” social capital, which is outwardly focused and extends 
across social divides. Like human capital and cultural capital, social capital is 
understood to confer resources upon individuals.  
Our concept of socio-political capital draws more on Bourdieu than on Putnam 
because our interest is chiefly in individual political actors. As observed by Siisiäinen: 
„Putnam‟s idea of social capital deals with collective values and societal integration, 
whereas Bourdieu‟s approach is made from the point of view of actors engaged in 
struggle in pursuit of their interests‟ (Siisiäinen, 2000: 10). Siisiäinen argues that 
„Putnam does not deal with politics […] his theory can be seen as a kind of wish to 
escape politics in the de Tocquevillean tradition‟ (ibid. 7). The following comparison 
of Bourdieu (and Coleman) and Putnam by Svendsen and Svendsen illustrates our 
preference for Bourdieu‟s approach: 
 
[…] Putnam‟s definition of social capital tends to be substantivist – amounts 
and numbers – compared to Coleman‟s and especially Bourdieu‟s, where 
social capital tends to be defined relationally, as an exchange that – embedded 
in dynamic and complex social processes – produces individual and social 
identities. Where Putnam sees social capital primarily as quantifiable relations, 
Bourdieu and Coleman are interested in these relations‟ emotional, cultural, 
and social quality (2004: 252). 
 
A limited body of international research examines the role of social capital in political 
participation. Bäck and Kestilä (2008), for example, examine empirically the relation 
between social capital and political trust in Finland. The „individual-level‟ data used 
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derive from the Finnish data in the European Social Survey (first round, 2002/2003), 
where the focus is on informal sociality rather than formal membership of voluntary 
associations. The study employs a narrow operationalisation of social capital  (i.e. 
trust and reciprocity scores – the main indices of social capital used by Putnam) in 
reference to subjective political competence or attitudes towards politics across three 
levels; trust in politicians (actors); trust in parliament (institutions) and satisfaction 
with democracy (political system or regime). Similarly, Van Londen et al. (2007) 
examine civic engagement (i.e. membership of associations), trust and voter 
participation by Turkish and Moroccan minorities in Rotterdam. 
A US study suggests that social connectedness (what Putnam measured in his 
studies of social capital) is a strong predictor of political participation across different 
ethnic groups (though the study measured this simply in terms of years of residency in 
the same community) (Leighley and Vedlitz, 1999). One study of Latino political 
participation in the United States found that English language proficiency had „an 
enormous effect upon Latino political participation‟ but that once English proficiency 
was taken into consideration, the Latino variable ceased to be significant. To a lesser 
extent the same held in the case of English-speaking Asian-Americans (Cho, 1999: 
1147). 
Church membership has been identified as explaining why African-Americans 
have greater participation rates than would be expected given their socio-economic 
status. Not so in the case of Latino‟s in the United States (their high affiliation with 
religious institutions notwithstanding) (Jones-Correa and Leal, 2001). The underlying 
explanation offered here relates to differences in political socialisation between 
Protestant African American churches and Latino Catholic congregations. As 
concluded by Verba et al.: 
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Latinos, a mostly Catholic group, in spite of recent defections to evangelical 
Protestant churches, are relatively unlikely to have the chance to develop civic 
skills in the context of church activity. African Americans, in contrast, are 
affiliated with Protestant churches that are especially rich in opportunities for 
the development of civic skills (1995: 523). 
 
Religiosity emerged as a potential influence on immigrant social capital in the Irish 
case. For example, the percentage of non-religious Nigerians (the largest African 
community) identified by the 2006 Census was just 0.7 percent (CSO, 2007c: 109). 
Studies of recent Catholic Polish immigrants in Britain have depicted these as 
considerably more religiously active than the host Catholic population (See Davis et 
al., 2007). The 2006 census found that 93 percent of Polish immigrants in Ireland are 
Roman Catholic (with 5 per cent ticking the „no religion‟ box) (CSO, 2008: 30). 
In considering the significance of cultural capital on immigrant political 
participation our research placed emphasis on pre-migratory political socialisation, 
levels of education and employment status. Some of the research challenges here are 
summarised in the following terms by Jones-Correa and Andalon: 
 
The immigration experience provides a unique opportunity to test hypotheses 
about political socialization. The immigration experience itself serves as a 
distinct break in socialization contexts for an identifiable, delimited adult 
population. Immigrant populations allow researchers to gauge the effects of 
both recent and prior socialization for adults operating in new social and 
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political contexts. Are there breaks or continuities with previous patterns of 
socialization and participation? (2008: 3). 
 
Several studies of immigrants to Australia and Canada suggest that there may well be 
an absence of continuity between pre-migratory and post-migratory political 
socialisation (Jones-Correa and Andalon, 2008; Finifter and Finifter, 1989; Black, 
1987). Here the literature suggests that different pre-migratory experiences translate 
into different degrees of continuity in respect of political participation and that 
culture, understood as an admixture of social capital and political socialisation, needs 
to be examined as a factor on a case-by-case basis.   
Some US research has linked naturalisation to temporal delays in political 
participation. In the Irish case, expectations amongst immigrants that they will or will 
not naturalise are posited as influencing the nature and extent of political 
participation. Research on political mobilisation amongst naturalised Latinos in the 
United States suggests that perceptions of threat by migrants can be an impetus to 
both naturalisation and political participation: „Latino permanent residents, sensing 
growing hostility to their political and economic interests, chose to naturalise and 
enter the political system in large numbers‟ (Pantoja et al., 2001: 747). This suggests 
that equivalent motivational stakes might pertain in respect of African migrants in the 
Irish case. 
The overwhelming majority of immigrants in Ireland have not naturalised. 
Many, if not most, are not resident in the country long enough to be eligible. The 
experience of other EU Member States suggests that most immigrants from these are 
unlikely to seek Irish citizenship because they do not need to do so to obtain 
employment and social entitlements. Proximity to other European countries, low cost 
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travel and rights to free movement may serve to undermine civil and political 
participation in Irish society. This suggests a potentially low impetus for some forms 
of political and civic participation amongst EU migrants compared to non-EU 
migrants. However, Polish migrants are not prevented from acquiring dual nationality; 
naturalisation as Irish citizens would not require them to forfeit Polish citizenship.
 
 
Other potentially relevant factors emphasised in the international literature 
included host-country language fluency and naturalisation, factors both correlated 
with time of residence in the host country (Jones-Correa and Andalon, 2008; Pantoja 
et al., 2001). Several studies undertaken in the United States identified acquisition of 
English language, US citizenship and duration of residence as factors that accounted 
for greater participation amongst migrants in electoral and non-electoral politics 
(Junn, 1997; Cho, 1999; Ramakirshnan and Espenshade, 2001). The right of non-
citizen migrants to vote in Irish local elections allows for immediate political 
participation unimpeded by the time delays associated with the naturalisation process. 
Nevertheless, the hypothesis that levels of political activism may be influenced by 




Human Capital  
 
All but one of the African respondents was educated to degree level. The sole 
exception had a management diploma. Two had masters degrees and one was 
completing a masters degree. Of the ten respondents, two were graduates in English 
and literature, one in economics, one in marketing, one in information technology, 
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one in communications, one in industrial chemistry and mineral processing, one was 
completing a masters degree in international relations, and one held three masters 
degrees in adult and community education, business administration and healthcare 
management. 
Comparisons between their pre-migratory and post-migratory occupational 
status (using CSO socio-economic group categories) revel that four African 
respondents retained their pre-migratory status, two moved to a higher socio-
economic category, two moved to lower categories (one being unemployed) and three 
fell under category H (own account workers), which can indicate either upward or 
downward shifts in employment status. In summary, their pre-migratory status = 2 x 
A (employers and managers), 2 x B (higher professional), 3 x C (lower professional), 
1 x E (manual skilled), 1 x H (own account worker), 1 x Z (other employed). By 
comparison their post-migratory status = 2 x A, 3 x B, 1 x C, 3 x H and 1 
unemployed. On the basis of occupational status African candidates were somewhat 
atypical of the wider African migrant population as identified in the 2006 census and 
in 2008 ESRI research which identified extremely disproportionate unemployment 
amongst Black people – nine times that of Irish nationals (O‟Connell and McGinnity, 
2008). 
By comparison six of the East European respondents in our sample were 
educated to degree level (though three of these held masters degrees). All had 
completed secondary education. Of the four non-graduates one had dropped out of 
third level and one was in the process of applying to study accountancy. The six 
graduates held qualifications in law, pharmacy, accountancy, business administration 
and politics, and international relations. When the occupational status of East 
European respondents was compared to their pre-migratory occupational status, it was 
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found that four are in the same socio-economic group pre and post migration, four are 
in lower groups and two are in higher groups. In summary, their pre-migratory status 
= 1 x A (employers and managers), 3 x B (higher professional), 4 x C (lower 
professional), 1 x E (manual skilled), 1 x Z (other employed). By comparison their 
post-migratory status = 2 x A, 1 x B, 3 x C, 2 x D (non-manual), 1 x E and 1 x F 
(semi-skilled). 
Compared to African respondents, East Europeans in our sample experienced 
a greater degree of downward occupational mobility, which appears to support 
findings that immigrants from the New Member States (NMS) of the EU suffer the 
largest relative “occupational gap” (Barrett and Duffy, 2007: 14). Yet respondents 
typically appeared to fare better than the wider NMS population as identified by the 
2006 Census; six of the ten are in socio-economic groups A, B or C, compared to only 
9 per cent of the total Polish working population in Ireland (CSO, 2008: 30). 
 
Prior Political Socialisation as Cultural Capital 
 
Seven of the ten African respondents had distinct pre-migratory political socialisation. 
One stated that two of his brothers were local councillors in Nigeria, one had been a 
party secretary for the SDP at the local level in Nigeria, one had been a member of the 
NRC in Nigeria and one had been a member of the ANC in South Africa. Three had 
been active in student politics of which one came from “a family of politicians”, 
whose father, uncles and grandfather were active in politics in Nigeria (AF4). One 
with no pre-migratory involvement in politics stated that two of his siblings were 
councillors in Nigeria (AM2). Another African candidate with no such family history 
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depicted experiences of being a leader at school as a form of pre-migratory political 
socialisation:  
 
The first time I think I really had contact with politics was when I was in 
secondary school. I was elected class prefect […] From then I was really 
noticeable wherever I went. I was the class prefect until my final year and then 
I was elected the general prefect of the school. During that time too I 
happened to lead seven organisations in school. So people felt there was 
something I could do […] And right within me I am revolutionary, you know, 
I have to stand on my own and then mobilise people, be critical if there is a 
need about what is happening (AM5). 
 
Another similarly commented: “Politics really has always been a part of me. When I 
was a student I was a student‟s union leader, I stood in the elections […] so it was not 
something that I stumbled into” (AF2). A number of African respondents depicted 
themselves as putative community leaders in making statements such as; “I think that 
part of leadership is you shouldn‟t be afraid to take up responsibility” (AM2) and “as 
a leader I feel I can engender change from within” (AF2).  
Six of the ten East European respondents stated that they had no pre-migratory 
involvement in politics. Three of these stated that whilst they had not been involved in 
formal politics they had been active in social or voluntary organisations as an 




I worked as a volunteer in a few organisations. It was communist times. I was 
president for two years of a film discussion club. We presented films not 
available in official places. After that I was connected for six years with a 
Catholic organisation. It was about religious exhibitions, art […] I met some 
very interesting young people. It was not senso stricto political activity but it 
was political. I was never connected with any party (EEM2). 
 
Pre-migratory political socialisation amongst East European respondents was 
characterised by antipathy towards the political systems of their countries of origin – 
an issue that also emerged in discussions about voter registration. A number of Polish 
respondents argued that distrust of authority, grounded in pre-migratory experiences, 
impeded voter registration in Ireland. Poles in particular were depicted as unwilling to 
fill official forms or to enter Garda stations to enrol on the supplementary electoral 
register (Fanning, O‟Boyle and Shaw, 2009). Negative perceptions of home country 
politics explained why some respondents were inclined to discursively distance 
themselves formal politics and express misgivings about careerist understandings of 
politics. Typically these understood the term politician as a pejorative term, whilst 
emphasising their interest in working on behalf of their local community. 
Notwithstanding such antipathy all but one of the East European candidates 
interviewed had become members of Irish political parties. The sole exception had 
sought unsuccessfully a nomination from a political party. Five of these candidates 
stated that their decision to stand for election was directly influenced (and in some 
cases directly encouraged) by Irish members of political parties. In effect, some of 
these were invited to join political parties or to stand. One respondent described being 
asked to stand for Fine Gael by an Irish friend who was a member of the party and 
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who he had first come into contact with at a town council meeting. He described 
attending several town council meetings and encountering “a few people that I 
consider good people that I didn‟t know were Fine Gael” (EEM3). A Fianna Fáil 
candidate similarly described being directly approached by a local councillor whom 
she had come to know in her area. Her decision to stand was primarily an outcome of 
her participation in social networks outside of her community of origin, which was 
equally important in the cases of two other East European candidates. 
 
 
Membership of Groups and Networks (Bridging and Bonding Social Capital) 
 
  
Fifteen of the twenty respondents were affiliated to a political party. For some, party 
membership was experienced as a form of bridging social capital. One respondent 
described how being a member of an Irish political party offered immigrants a means 
of overcoming feelings of alienation within Irish society and also provided a way to 
“show the Irish people that we can do something together”. For this respondent, 
membership of a political party was seen to provide a sense of belonging: “I think for 
me it is important to be in a party because that way I feel a part of Irish society” 
(EEM1).  
All of the African respondents stated that they were members of community 
organisations and voluntary groups (Fig. 1). These include AkiDwa and the Africa 
Centre. With one exception (an Ebo support group), each of these organisations 
represented Africans from divergent religious and ethnic groups. In each case 
respondents identified themselves as members of Irish community groups and 
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networks as well as immigrant ones (although almost half of the male respondents did 
not elaborate on the nature of their involvement in „immigrant groups‟, suggesting 
predominantly informal ties with other immigrants). The four female African 
respondents stated that they were members of immigrant groups, but were also 
members of Irish organisations, including community and voluntary organisations and 
intercultural networks. On this basis African female respondents appeared to possess 
both more bridging and bonding social capital than males.   
  
 
Fig. 1: Bridging and bonding social capital of African respondents
2
 






Church affiliation  Membership of 
political party 
AF1  N=2 N=4 Active member of 
Protestant congregation  
Green Party 
AM1  N=2 Active member of 
Protestant congregation 
Fine Gael 
AM2  N=1 Practicing Muslim Fianna Fáil 
AM3  N=4 Practicing Catholic  Independent 
AF2 N=3 N=1 Practicing  Catholic  Fine Gael 
AM4  N=1 Active member of 
Protestant congregation 
Independent 
AM5 N=1 N=1  Active member of 
Protestant congregation 
Green Party 
AM6 N=1 N=2 Not religious Independent 
AF3 N=2 N=4. Practicing Catholic  Independent 
AF4 N=2 
 
N=3 Active member of 
Protestant congregation 




Compared to African respondents, the level of participation of East European 
respondents in both Irish and immigrant organisations and networks was low (Fig. 2). 
                                                 
2
 The names of specific organisations are not included to protect the anonymity of respondents. In 
summary, these included organisations with a national membership (e.g. Cairde, AIDS Alliance, 
Integrating Ireland, Community Workers Co-op, trade unions) and local groups (e.g. chambers of 
commerce, policing fora, community integration groups, neighbourhood watch groups, residents 
associations,  women‟s groups, sports clubs and braches of citizen information centres and homeless 
charities). 
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Just three East European respondents were members of Irish organisations; of these 
two were female. Of the ten East European respondents, five (all Polish) stated that 
they were members of Polish organisations but were not members of Irish community 
organisations or groups other than a political party. Seven in all were members of 
Forum Polonia and two were members of the Polish Toastmaster‟s Club in Ireland. 










                                                 
3
 The names of specific Irish organisations are not included to protect the anonymity of respondents. In 
summary, one respondent did occasional voluntary work for a local charity, one participated in a spring 
cleaning initiative, and just one was member of multiple organisations (county development 
partnership, a sports organisation, a Chernobyl children‟s project, an Irish charity, and an intercultural 
organisation). 










EEM1 N=1  Practicing 
Catholic  
Fine Gael 
EEF1 N=1  Not religious Labour Party 
EEM2 N=2  Not religious N/A 
EEM3 N=1  Practicing 
Catholic  
Fine Gael 
EEM4 N=1 N-1 Practicing 
Catholic  
Fianna Fáil 









EEF3   Practicing  
Catholic 
Fine Gael 
EEF4 N=1  Practicing 
Catholic 
Fianna Fáil 
EEM6 N=2  No response Fine Gael 
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In the run up to the 2009 local elections Forum Polonia emerged as the leading 
representative voice of the Polish community; all Polish respondents were members. 
Forum Polonia has two stated goals; promoting the integration and enhancing the 
image of the Polish community in Ireland. 
 
Forum Polonia is a cooperative platform that brings together representatives of 
various Polish community organisations, the media, and individuals involved 
in projects relating to the Polish minority and its links to Irish society as a 
whole. The Forum operates through information exchanges, mutual supports, 
social integration, and promoting and developing the interests of the Polish 
community in the Republic of Ireland (www.forumpolonia.org/en/o-nas/). 
 
A key stated aim of the Forum is to „reach a common policy stance on issues relevant 
to the Polish community‟. Forum Polonia (FP) works as a „network of links and 
contacts which facilitate information exchanges as well as mutual supports and 
assistance; establishing of working groups to initiate, develop and implement projects 
coordinated by a project leader; cooperating with other bodies in Poland‟ 
(www.forumpolonia.org/en/o-nas/). As a national-level organisation representing a 
trans-national Diaspora, FP was arguably ill-equipped to support Polish candidates at 
a local level. As put by one Polish respondent (who was not a member of any Irish 
organisations or networks) prior to election: 
 
I think Forum Polonia is a great idea, they do big work, big money invested in 
posters and leaflets, people are very engaged to make popular the idea of 
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taking part in an election. But everything is focused on voting, not as standing 
as a candidate. So I‟m a bit disappointed (EEM2). 
 
This suggests that FP worked more effectively at generating bonding rather than 
bridging social capital. But it was also the case that FP played an influential role in 
fostering relationships between the Polish community and the two largest political 
parties. Both had recruited Polish integration officers who were active FP members 
and extensive outreach by Fianna Fáil to immigrant communities was almost entirely 
directed at the Polish community; this included meetings attended by government 
ministers and party leaders, social events aimed at bringing senior party members and 
members of the Polish community together as well recruitment activities via the 
Polski section on the party website homepage (Fanning, O‟Boyle and Shaw, 2009: 
Appendix 3). Fine Gael similarly focused most of its efforts on engaging with 
immigrants from the Polish community; there were some indications that mutual 
perceptions of common values influenced these. One respondent described being 
attracted to Fine Gael because it was a Christian Democrat party like Civic Forum 
(both were allied in the EU parliament). A few Polish respondents described how their 
involvement in Fine Gael came about through social contacts with Irish fellow 
Catholics, suggesting that religious social capital had helped get them selected as 
candidates.  
 
Religious Social Capital: Bonding or Bridging?  
 
All but one of the African respondents described themselves as religious. Of the eight 
Christians, three were Catholic and the remainder were from various Protestant 
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denominations. Seven in total, including one Muslim, described themselves as 
actively practicing their religion. Six described themselves as active Christian 
churchgoers. Of these three were members of Pentecostal congregations with one 
being an ordained pastor. A further two described themselves as semi-regular 
churchgoers.   
Many African respondents emphasised the role of their Church as a „social 
place‟ that gave them a sense of belonging. A number discussed how their religious 
beliefs influenced their participation in politics. For example, one said that although 
his entry into politics was not in any way religiously or spiritually motivated, his 
religious beliefs nevertheless inform his politics; religion acts as a moral guide when 
faced with difficult decisions: “So if you look at politics you have to make tough 
decisions going forward but when those decisions are made you have to ask your 
conscience and ask what would Jesus do” (AM1). Another asserted that it was “time 
that Godly people get into politics” (AM4). Overall, African respondents perceived 
their political and spiritual lives as intertwined. As put by one: “I can‟t divide myself” 
(AF4) and by another: “We are all political, we are all religious […] I‟m not a fanatic 
but my Christian values feed into everything I do” (AF1).  
African respondents tended to emphasise their involvement in community life 
through their membership of religious congregations, voluntary organisations and 
other associations. Whilst they did not always describe such involvement as the 
motivational impetus to enter politics (see below), it is suggested that religious and 
other forms of social capital fostered an ethos of participation (see O‟Boyle, 2009). 
Of the ten East European respondents, six described themselves as actively 
religious Catholics. One identified himself as Catholic but claimed that he does not go 
to church; one claimed that she is not religious and one did not answer this question.   
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The sole identified non-Catholic (Russian Orthodox) did not attend church. Of the 
actively religious Catholics, one described being pleasantly surprised to discover that 
a town council meeting he attended “started with a prayer” (EEM3). When he asked 
about this a local councillor explained that Fine Gael is a Christian Democratic party. 
For some Polish respondents membership of the Catholic Church was experienced as 
a form of bridging social capital which helped them to integrate into Irish society. 
Several Polish respondents expressed dissatisfaction with the Polish Catholic Church 
and described being more attracted to the Irish Catholic Church. As put by one: 
“Polish priests are not friendly” (EEF1). Another similarly commented:  
 
What I love about Irish priests is that they come down to the bar for a pint. But 
you know why they do it? They want to meet the people in a place outside of 
the church. They want to integrate; they want to be one of the people. They are 
not driving fancy cars like they do in Poland (EEM4).  
 
Whilst Poles were far less likely to exhibit bridging social capital, defined in terms of 
membership of non-Polish organisations, for some religion functioned as a form of 
bridging social capital. For African respondents, on the other hand, religion was more 
likely to function as bonding social capital. The limited capacity of this to secure 
integration into wider Irish society arguably accounts for the proactive involvement of 







Motivational states refer to perceived identifiable interests in political outcomes either 
in terms of individual gain or as a member of an immigrant community. Motivational 
stakes refer to rationale for participation. Our interviews with immigrant candidates 
suggest that they get involved in Irish politics for many of the same complex reasons 
as other persons but that there are specific reasons for immigrants also. The reasons as 
articulated by respondents (Fig. 3) need to be interpreted with caution.
4
 It can be 
assumed, for example, that anyone standing for political office will be motivated to 
some degree by what we term “personal instrumentality”. Bourdieu, in fact, is highly 
sceptical of altruistic action that is putatively free of any specific interest on the part 
of an actor (Siisiäinen, 2000: 18). Five candidates – four African and one East 
European candidate (none of whom were „independents‟) – revealed a high degree of 
personal instrumentality, understood as expressions of self-interest pertaining to 
personal goals (career, business etc.) in explaining their political motivations. Two 
African respondents claimed that “business interests” played a significant part in their 
entry into politics (AM1, AM2). In contrast, the other three candidates viewed politics 
as a potential career in itself or as a vehicle for their careers in more general terms. 
This careerist orientation seems to have influenced their choice of political party; all 
five were standing on behalf of one of the two parties in government i.e. Fianna Fáil 





                                                 
4
 Unlike other sections of this article, which refer to all twenty respondents, this table only includes 
candidates in the local government elections (i.e. a total of 18).  
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Fig. 3: Motivational stakes as expressed by respondents 
































AF1  X  X (c) X  X 
AM1  X  X (c) X   
AM2  X  X (c) X   
AM3 (i)   X (c) X   
AF2    X (c) X  X 
AM4 (i)   X (c) X   
AM5    X (c) X   
AM6 (i)  X X (c) X  X 
AF3    X (c) X  X 
AF4 X (i) X  X (c) X  X 
EEM1 X   X X   
EEF1    X (c) X X  
EEM2    X (c) X X  
EEM3    X (c) X X  
EEM4  X  X X X  
EEM5 X   X (c) X   
EEF2    X (c) X X  
EEF3     X (c)    
Total 3 5 1 18 17 5 5 
 




African respondents overwhelmingly did not identify with any political ideology per 
se. When discussing their political views or problems (such as racism) they tended to 
extol Christian humanist values. Only one African candidate claimed to be attracted to 
the distinctive values of her party (the Green Party), however, she also considered that 
political parties in Ireland are largely interchangeable (AF4). Only one respondent (a 
Polish candidate) used the word “ideology” in explaining his attraction to Fine Gael 
(EEM1). Another East European candidate (a Russian) claimed that his long term 
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interests in Green Peace and environmentalism were important factors in his joining 
the Green Party. All other candidates described their attraction to parties in terms of 
their personal experiences, emphasising such things as their party‟s openness to 
immigrants or its organisational culture.  
  Four of the five „independent‟ candidates in our sample regarded Irish political 
parties as largely interchangeable and tended to be cynical about political parties. One 
African independent stated that Irish political parties “have a blueprint, they don‟t like 
to change” (AM4) while another insisted that all parties are now merely “window 
shopping for immigrant faces” (AM6). The only East European independent 
candidate in our sample (a Pole) similarly insisted that no party “is fighting for the 
votes of the Polish community” and that none was especially interested in immigrants 
(EEM2). 
 Only one respondent in our entire sample – an African independent candidate 
– claimed that a desire to promote the distinct needs of his own community of origin 
was an important motivation for entering politics. In this case, his desire to promote 
the needs of Africans in Ireland stemmed from his first-hand experience of racism and 
prejudice.  
All eighteen candidates claimed an interest in promoting the needs of their 
immediate local area when explaining their motivation for entering politics. 
Crucially, sixteen of the eighteen candidates interviewed had children living with 
them in Ireland; in this respect Polish candidates were markedly atypical of the wider 
Polish population as found by the 2006 census. Some repeatedly drew on the 
experiences of their children and other family members to illustrate the changes they 
hoped to effect and therefore their motivations must be viewed as both personally and 
publicly orientated. As put by one African respondent: “My motivation is basically 
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[…] my community has no facilities. When I came here my daughter wasn‟t able to 
meet friends or even play with neighbours” (AM3). Respondents in both groups also 
emphasised the need for improved facilities and amenities and drew attention to a host 
of local problems (such as poor infrastructure, limited public transport and anti-social 
behaviour etc.) which they felt were compounding the social isolation experienced by 
immigrants in particular. One African respondent described this impetus for 
participation in the following terms:  
 
Yes I‟m a migrant, but I‟m also a woman. I‟m also a mum who has got 
children who are in school like everybody else so participation would have 
been a very big issue. There are a lot of things that impede participation of 
people at different levels, like access to education and access to healthcare 
services. And then access to employment as well. But also issues such as the 
environment and issues such as transport are big, big issues (AF1).  
 
Another African candidate stated that he became politically active because anti-social 
behaviour, vandalism and intimidation of his staff were affecting his business (AM1). 
A number of respondents depicted their engagement with Irish politics as community 
activism, frequently self-identifying as “community activists” rather than politicians 
(e.g. AM3). As put by one: “If you view politics as going to Dublin and being very 
loud then no. I prefer to work with small communities, just to be a voice for a few 
people” (EEF1). As similarly put by another (a candidate for a different political 
party): “To be honest I am not that interested in politics – about parties and things like 
that. But to do something in the community here you need to have some power” 
(EEM3).  
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Unsurprisingly, all but one candidate (seventeen) spoke of a desire to foster 
integration when explaining their political motivation. As with the desire to promote 
the needs of their immediate local area, the desire to foster integration was expressed 
by an approximately equal number of African and East European candidates. 
Respondents in both groups described wanting to become a “voice” for their wider 
(i.e. Irish and migrant) communities and to encourage the integration of migrants in 
general. Directly linking to their interest in promoting the needs of their immediate 
local area, respondents frequently argued that integration must take root at the local 
level. As put by one respondent: “I believe so much in grassroots […] we have to 
cultivate good neighbourliness. If you live in a place you need to be friends with your 
neighbours. They will get to know you […] Let us on the local level organise things 
and bring people together” (AM5). 
A concern about alienation was described by five of the eight East European 
candidates (four of whom are Polish) as a specific motivation for entering politics. 
(Only one Polish candidate did not specify this as a motivation). Although integration 
into mainstream Irish society remains a problem for African and East European 
immigrants alike, the latter explain that in coming to Ireland as migrant workers (i.e. 
for economic reasons), East Europeans generally have poorly developed social 
networks in comparison to Africans and other groups. For Polish respondents in 
particular their concerns tended to be articulated as an anti-politics 
communitarianism, influenced by experiences of alientation from party politics in 
their country of origin. Amongst Polish respondents the need to address the social 
isolation of immigrants emerged as a distinct motivating factor. In essence, civic and 
political participation were envisaged as a response (or antidote) to alienation and 
isolation brought about by economic circumstances. As put by a Polish respondent: 
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Most Polish people came here for work, for economic reasons, so they try to 
save as much as they can and don‟t go out. That‟s why integration here is a bit 
worse. That‟s why I would like to have meetings with Polish and Irish people 
so they will work together and maybe socialise more […] it doesn‟t need to 
cost money. Maybe we could clean a part of the town, plant flowers 
somewhere, then after we could meet and maybe have a barbeque or 
something. That‟s one thing because in Poland there are usually meeting 
places in every town with a canopy over it. I think if I get into the council I 
will try to create a place like that (EEM3). 
 
Half of the African respondents in our sample cited experiences of racism and 
discrimination as a core motivation for becoming involved in politics. One candidate 
described her entry into politics as “the only available path left to try” (AFI). For 
another the decision was explained experientially: “Coming to Ireland and 
experiencing racism and discrimination […] once you‟ve experienced it you know 
how it feels, you know where it hurts” (AF2). While an approximately equal number 
of African and East European respondents expressed concerns about integration, the 
former were more prone to argue that integration demands certain preconditions, such 
as adequate representation, access channels and basic rights.  As put by one African 
respondent (an independent): “We need immigrants at the higher level to speak for 
immigrants […] you can‟t have integration without representation” (AM6).  
 
Status Factors   
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Status factors refer to the ways in which citizenship and legal status directly or 
indirectly influence immigrant participation activism and participation. Such factors 
were exemplified by an African respondent who described how insecurities about 
residency status impeded her involvement in social issues: 
 
Often immigrants start out with immigrant-specific concerns (residency status, 
immigration issues, English language) but gradually move on to more 
mainstream concerns (childcare, housing, public transport etc). One of our 
Nigerian members described it as “if you are thirsty you only care about 
getting water”. That‟s how it is with what is your immediate concern. If I need 
residency, I only care about that, not about public transport. But once I am 
settled and maybe get a job, I want to sort out how to get to work by public 
transport and I no longer care about residency but public transport (AF1). 
 
However, all ten African respondents had secure residency status and, having arrived 
in Ireland between 1999 and 2003, were comparatively longstanding immigrant 
members of Irish society. While Eastern European respondents typically emphasised 
economic security as a prerequisite for civic and political participation, some African 
respondents described a hierarchy of needs which placed residency status as a priority 
need: 
 
Yes I‟ve just gained Irish citizenship. It took two and a half years to process. 
But then it‟s great because everything, even in Ireland, revolves around 
citizenship. There is so much dichotomy and the Irish system has created a 
hierarchy of Irish citizens really because under the rights of the child the Irish 
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child is supposed to enjoy being raised among all family members but among 
immigrants there is a category of Irish children who are not allowed to enjoy 
that same privilege of their family members around them. So the Irish state 
effectively creates categories of Irish citizens which I think is bad (AF2). 
 
The above respondent was the only one of the ten Africans interviewed to have Irish 
citizenship, however, eight stated that they intended to naturalise. One was a citizen of 
another EU state and cited this as a reason for not becoming an Irish citizen and one 
did not answer this question. Nevertheless, the desire to naturalise should not be 
interpreted as a disavowal of native nationality. For example, one respondent stated 
that if forced to choose between being Irish or Nigerian she would choose to keep her 
Nigerian passport: 
 
Because home is home. Nigeria is the only place, as bad as it, that I really feel 
I am home. Yes Ireland is home now but Irish people keep reminding me that 
my home is somewhere else. It‟s there in my consciousness that this is not 
home because every time they ask “do you like it here?”, “will you go back 
home?!” So I don‟t feel that I‟m really a part of this society even though I see 
it as home. So those are some of the challenges our children will have. This is 
their home (AF2). 
  
Half of the East European respondents in our sample stated that they intended to 
naturalise even though being citizens of another EU state conferred residence status 
upon them. One respondent whose country of origin did not permit dual citizenship 
described her reluctance to change nationality (EEF3). Even though Poles are entitled 
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to dual citizenship one Polish respondent described his unwillingness to become an 
Irish citizen. In essence, he viewed this as compromising his Polish identity (EEM3). 
However, collectively considered the responses provided by Eastern European 
respondents to questions of legal status disproved the original hypothesis that EU 
migrants would be less likely to naturalise. All but two Eastern European candidates 
had children living in Ireland. As put by one Polish respondent: “My baby is Irish so I 
want to be too. I think citizenship is good if people want to stay here” (EEF1). 
Another stated: “If I stay in Ireland and if I get the chance I will apply for Irish 
citizenship because I will never be an Irish person but I am part of Irish society and 
when you are a citizen you have full rights” (EEM1). Nevertheless, East European 
respondents also frequently discussed the limitations of naturalisation as a means of 
integration, pointing out that if they acquired Irish citizenship they would not „become 
Irish‟.  As put by one: “It makes a difference applying for jobs but […] it doesn‟t feel 
like home – you are still a foreigner” (EEF1).   
 
Analysis and conclusion 
 
Our initial hypothesis was that barriers to economic integration encountered by many 
Africans (due to racism, non-recognition of qualifications and being unable to work 
whilst asylum applications were being considered) shunted putative leaders towards 
civic and voluntary sector roles whilst Poles, a more recent immigrant cohort, were 
archetypically in paid employment but were more atomised, less engaged in civic 
participation but less preoccupied with residency status issues (always an issue for 
non EU-migrants). With respect to African candidates our hypothesis was partly 
borne out. All of these were members of a number of voluntary organisations but just 
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two were employed in the voluntary sector. A further two were not in paid 
employment but were members of a number of voluntary organisations. However, six 
of the ten African respondents were employed in the private sector or were self-
employed but some of these were unemployed or in jobs that did not reflect their pre-
migratory socio-economic status. Even so, the socio-economic profile of African 
respondents found them considerably better off than most Africans. 
Our hypothesis concerning Polish political participation was considerably 
borne out; concerns about alienation experienced by members of their communities of 
origin emerged as the main distinctive motive for participation by Polish and other 
East European candidates. East European respondents were far less engaged in 
community organisations than were Africans.  Residency status emerged as less of a 
predictor of immigrant political participation than suggested by the international 
literature; non-citizen immigrants are entitled to vote in and contest Irish local 
government elections. Yet, interviews with African candidates suggested that these 
would not have been willing to stand if their residency status had not been resolved. 
Our initial hypothesis that Polish and other EU-migrants would be 
comparatively disinterested in naturalisation was not borne out. Arguably this was the 
case partly because the profile of East European candidates – mostly parents 
interested in community issues – differed considerably from the general status of such 
migrants found in the 2006 Census of Population. A striking finding was that all but 
two of the candidates we interviewed had children living in Ireland. In effect, such 
candidates were self-selecting persons particularly interested in integrating within 
Irish society; many referred to the experiences of their children in discussing their 
motivations to stand for election.  
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The sole reason for standing cited by all candidates was the wish to promote 
the needs of their local area.  The second most commonly cited reason was a wish to 
foster integration.  Few candidates identified or were attracted by ideologies particular 
to any political party. The main difference in motivational stakes expressed by 
African and East European respondents was that the former emphasised concerns 
about racism, discrimination and lesser rights whilst the latter emphasised concerns 
about alienation experienced by members of their community of origin.    
Both Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael presumed a Eurocentric cultural affinity with 
the (Catholic) Polish community in advance of the election; both recruited Poles as 
integration officers and targeted much of their centralised efforts at recruiting 
immigrant party members at the Polish community. To some extent this was the result 
of successful engagement with these political parties by Forum Polonia. African 
organisations have not successfully engaged with political parties and are instead 
preoccupied with bottom-up civic participation. Some parallels emerge between our 
findings of lower levels of involvement by Poles than Africans in immigrant-led 
organisations and those of Verba et al. (1995: 523) which identified differences in 
civic skills between Protestant African Americans and Latino Catholics attributable to 
church activity. We did not find that African religiosity directly translated into 
entrepreneurial political mobilisation, although one of the candidates we interviewed 
was a pastor (as was one African candidate in 2004). However, some African 
respondents had founded or were leaders of immigrant groups.  
Our research highlights the importance of social capital in fostering political 
participation amongst immigrants. Our analysis supports the essentially Bourdieuian 
notion of capital attracting capital and the interconvertibility of different kinds of 
capital. This article placed considerable emphasis on “socio-political capital”, 
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examined using socio-economic status (pre and post migration), prior political 
socialisation, membership of groups and networks, and religious social capital. In 
respect of socio-economic status, all twenty respondents were found to be atypical of 
their nationality profiles in the 2006 census. Respondents possessed high levels of 
human capital (markedly so in the case of African respondents) even if these were 
under employed. Unable to maximise the use of their human capital Africans were 
typically active in Irish and immigrant organisations where they developed 
considerable social capital. Some respondents, both African and East European, 
described being approached by more than one political party to contest the election. In 
essence they were perceived as having politically valuable social capital attributes. 
Examples  amongst African respondents included being successful in business, being 
prominent members of trade unions, having a media profile or being viewed as 
immigrant leaders or otherwise able to deliver immigrant votes.  
Prior political socialisation emerged as a significant form of cultural capital 
amongst African respondents; of these a distinctive political habitus was evident 
whereby individuals had been acculturated into leadership roles, had pre-migratory 
experience of politics as party members or within political families, pointing to a 
cultural capital explanation for their involvement in Irish politics. Pre-migratory 
political socialisation did not emerge as a significant factor for East European 
candidates. The main identifiable form of accrued cultural capital seems to have been 
Catholicism which translated, in a predominantly Catholic host society, into a form of 
bridging social capital.    
 African religiosity, which was predominantly Protestant, did not translate into 
bridging social capital. Arguably the considerable efforts made by African candidates 
to integrate by joining Irish organisations sought to compensate for this. Africans 
 37 
were considerably more “networked” than East European respondents. Africans were 
not merely involved in a greater number of associations, groups and networks but, 
more importantly, were involved in both immigrant and Irish organisations. East 
European respondents were far less likely to be members of Irish organisations other 
than political parties. Here some benefited from religious social capital; three of the 
four Polish respondents who were members of Fine Gael were active Catholics and 
two of these referred to social contacts with local members of that party as 
instrumental in their joining political parties or being selected as candidates. All three 
Eastern European respondents who were members of Fianna Fáil described 
themselves as practicing Catholics again suggesting that having the same religion as 
the host community worked for them as a form of bridging social capital. For some 
Polish respondents religious social capital fulfilled the same bridging role as being 
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